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Abstract    The  growth  of  the  practice  of  lifelogging,  exploiting  the  capabilities 
provided by the exponential increase in computer storage, and using technologies 
such as SenseCam as well as location-based services, Web 2.0, social networking 
and photo-sharing sites, has led to a growing sense of unease, articulated in books 
such as Mayer-Schönberger's Delete, that the semi-permanent storage of memo-
ries could lead to problematic social consequences. This talk examines the argu-
ments against lifelogging and storage, and argues that they seem less worrying 
when  placed  in  the  context  of  a  wider  debate  about  the  nature  of  mind  and 
memory  and their relationship to our environment and the technology we use. 
Introduction 
The relationship between memory, representation and recollection is highly unu-
sual and counterintuitive. In particular, memories can misrepresent past events in 
what would seem to be all key respects, and yet still facilitate immediate recogni-
tion of veridical representations (e.g. video footage of an event). Many psycholo-
gists,  for  example  Elizabeth  Loftus  (Loftus  and  Palmer  1974,  Loftus  and  Zanni 
1975, Loftus 1979, Wells 1993), have been able to show that eyewitnesses can be 
deeply unreliable in recall, especially if misled by the forms queries are put, or by 
interfering information, yet this does not preclude accuracy in identification. The 
fact that a person was misremembered as having dark hair and a moustache does 
not mean that they might not be recalled with the shock of recognition: “yes, that‟s 
the fellow!” 
There are many interesting issues in the philosophy of mind here. Clearly, the 
„filing cabinet‟ metaphor of memory (that it contains a set of representations of the 2  
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past, organized to facilitate retrieval, such that exposure to a suitable cue will al-
low recall in some process analogous to the withdrawal of a properly-filed docu-
ment from a filing cabinet) is as inappropriate as it is naïve (cf. Warnock 1987, 8-
9). It is not the aim of this chapter to make any strong claim about what metaphor 
would be an appropriate replacement, but it is worth noting a few implications. 
First,  there  are many different kinds of memory (Tulving 1985), including se-
mantic memory (which includes fairly fixed notions such as meaning), and episod-
ic  memory  (of  events),  and  memories  can  be  lodged  temporarily  in  short-term, 
working memory, or become part of one‟s long-term memory. In this chapter, alt-
hough I shall make no special assumptions about whether a memory is temporary 
or  permanent,  I  shall  broadly be concerned with long-term memories, and I will 
focus primarily  on episodic memory. 
Second, one‟s episodic memory is a memory of something – an event, which is 
referred to via some kind of representation. The representation can be veridical or 
not, and I shall assume that a human memory of a past event may misrepresent it 
in a number of crucial ways, yet is associated with it even so. As the old Maurice 
Chevalier song had it, 
We met at nine. 
- We met at eight. 
I was on time. 
- No, you were late. 
Ah yes, I remember it well. 
The joke here is that the two singers have completely opposite recollections of 
the significant event in their lives, and yet agree entirely on its identification. As 
Marcel  Proust  (still  one  of  the  most  acute  theorists  of  memory) argued, one‟s 
memories are coloured by one‟s present assumptions and mental models; an ap-
parently  insignificant  event can appear significant in retrospect because it con-
tained a first encounter with a person whom one later came to love. 
Third, in this chapter I shall discuss the use of technology to support recollec-
tion. In particular, one often uses representations such as photographs to support 
recall. I shall make the obviously idealizing assumption that a photograph does not 
misrepresent the past in the way that a memory can; the camera was pointed and 
the image captured. Of course images can be Photoshopped, but that requires hu-
man intervention to cause the misrepresentation. Further, images can give a false 
impression, as for example when a trick of perspective makes a distant large ob-
ject look near and miniature; again, the misrepresentation requires a human inter-
preter. As a matter of fact I do not think that mechanical reproductions are essen-
tially veridical representations, but it will make the argument simpler and clearer 
if we pretend that they are, in contrast with human memories which may or may 
not be veridical. 
Finally,  although  I  make  no  assumptions  about  what  a  memory  is  (about 
whether, for instance, it is a mental state, or a brain state), I will assume that its 
nature is not necessarily constant. It may be that a memory is actually regenerated 
at recall time, and so doesn‟t „exist‟ at all at other times. Or, it may be that when 3 
  Narcissus to a Man 
exposed to veridical representations, a memory that has previously misrepresented 
the past can alter so as to provide a better representation. This isn‟t something I 
wish to go into detail about even if I were able, but the main point is that memory 
is  constantly  changing,  in  response  to  conversations  with  other  people about 
events, constant narration of events by oneself and others, exposure to news re-
ports,  photographs,  videos,  and  inference  from  the  effects  of  the  remembered 
event. My memory of an event may misrepresent an important character as having 
a moustache, but once I have seen a photograph of him, I realise that he had no 
moustache, and my memory adapts accordingly. 
In this paper, I wish to consider the interactions between memory and the in-
creasingly ubiquitous technology to support it. In particular, I want to focus on 
what is normative for memory, and shall argue that the use of technology has in-
creased the prominence of truth in that role. This is not necessarily a bad thing, but 
it is a newish development, and as technological supports increase dramatically, 
will continue to drive important social and psychological change. These consid-
erations should be used to help drive our reactions and regulations in areas such as 
privacy, deletion, data protection and informational self-determination. 
Before I discuss the current state-of-the-art in the use of technology to support 
memory, I will set out three themes which drive much of the discussion in this ar-
ea  in  the  next  section.  The following section will describe memory technology. 
The  final  substantive section will look at some recent worries about the use of 
such technologies, which claim that it more or less subtly undermines human or 
social  capacities. I shall argue that the issues that pertain to the normativity of 
truth for memory  are the most serious. 
Three Themes 
In this section I will set out three intellectual themes which have helped lay the 
ground for the widespread use of memory-supporting technology; in the case of 
the  first two themes at least, the causal links go both ways, so that the use of 
memory-supporting  technology  has  also  given  the  intellectual  positions  more 
plausibility. The links between the ideas and the technology are meant only to be 
broad associations – the narratives which I outline are certainly not intended as se-
rious intellectual history. 4  
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Theme #1: Extended Cognition 
Personal and  Public 
A memory has both personal (private) and public aspects, and recollection and re-
construction of past (and present) require deep interactions between these aspects. 
Our memories are not necessarily photographic representations of the past, nor are 
they any the worse if they are not; conversely, photographs are not memories. As 
Proust put it in Time Regained: 
An hour is not merely an hour, it is a vase full of scents and sounds  and projects and 
climates, and what we call reality is a certain connexion between these immediate 
sensations and the memories which envelop us simultaneously with them – a connexion 
that is suppressed  in a simple cinematographic vision, which just because  it professes to 
confine itself to the truth in fact departs widely  from it – a unique  connexion which the 
writer has to rediscover in order to link for ever in his phrase the two sets of phenomena 
which reality joins together. (Proust 1983, 924) 
Proust‟s point here is that memory is a creative capacity, which has developed 
not in the context of positivist scientific analysis and truth-telling, but rather as an 
evolutionary  adaptation.  The  „simple  cinematographic  vision‟  against  which 
Proust railed assumes that the „purpose‟ of a memory is simply the accurate repre-
sentation of the past event, whereas of course memory and other types of represen-
tation, such as art, have many other valuable functions. Yet the basic representa-
tive role can take over; as Baudelaire fumed in 1859: 
During this lamentable period, a new industry arose which contributed not a little to 
confirm stupidity in its faith and to ruin whatever might remain of the divine in the French 
mind. The idolatrous mob demanded an ideal worthy of itself and appropriate to its nature 
– that is perfectly understood. A revengeful God  has given ear to the prayers of this 
multitude. Daguerre was  His Messiah. From that moment our squalid society rushed, 
Narcissus  to a man, to gaze at its trivial image on a scrap of metal. 
Not  all  roles of memory pertain to the individual. As our social conventions 
have developed, so has memory‟s role in them; the practices of storytelling, narra-
tion and conversation involve the social construction of a past event in ways that 
may differ very much from both the individual‟s (private) perspective, and public-
ly accessible representations such as photographs or written accounts (cf. Olick 
1999,  Nelson  and  Fivush  2000,  Misztal  2003,  Cubitt  2007).  For  example, memo-
ries of a childhood event, told and retold as a family story, may interweave private 
sensations and parts of the narrative; even the person most involved in the original 
event may be unable to disentangle his own private recollection and the timeworn 
reconstruction of the story, with its favourite moments and recurring themes. 5 
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The Importance  of Abstraction 
In Jorge Luis Borges‟ famous story „Funes, his memory‟, also translated as „Funes 
the memorious‟, Funes is an ordinary young man who suffers a head injury and 
becomes incapable of forgetting. Many commentators have emphasized the ways 
in which Funes is disabled by this prodigious happenstance, but in fact Borges‟ 
emphasis, correctly, is on the rich picture of reality that he is able to achieve. 
Funes … was  virtually incapable of general, platonic ideas. Not only was it difficult for 
him to see that the generic symbol “dog” took in all the dissimilar individuals  of all 
shapes and sizes, it irritated him that the “dog” of three-fourteen in the afternoon seen in 
profile should be indicated by the same noun as the dog of three-fifteen, seen frontally. 
(Borges 1999, 136) 
Funes‟ real disability is his inability to abstract, although in his ironic way Bor-
ges does not portray it as a disability. The point of an abstraction is to support arti-
ficial  representation,  a useful substitute, inevitably and admittedly inaccurate in 
some  respects,  for  the  full  record,  enabling  action  and  communication  for  the 
boundedly rational. 
It also allows us to jump the semantic gap between the private sensations of 
different agents; two people can use abstraction as a mechanism to share thoughts 
and communicate their ideas. The imperfection of memory is essential to support 
communication. We do not need abstraction only because we are boundedly ra-
tional, and therefore need a shortcut to describe past events; we need the shortcut 
to communicate at all. As Borges‟ story emphasizes, even if our psychological ca-
pacities were not bounded (as Funes‟ memory is not), then failure to abstract leads 
to difficulties in testing, confirming and falsifying one‟s own thoughts and recol-
lections. One would fall foul, in other words, of Wittgenstein‟s private language 
argument. 
A definition surely serves to establish the meaning of a sign. – Well, that is done precisely 
by the concentration of my attention; for in this way I impress on myself the connexion 
between the sign and the sensation. – But “I impress it on myself” can only mean: this 
process brings it about that I remember the connexion right in the future. But in the 
present case I have no criterion of correctness. One would  like to say: whatever is going 
to seem right to me is right. And that only means here that we can‟t talk about „right‟. 
(Wittgenstein 1958, §258) 
In this famous passage from the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein is 
arguing against a fictitious interlocutor, who might be Funes, insisting that con-
centration of attention does the important psychological work; he argues instead 
that publicity is vital not only for communication, but also for one‟s own interpre-
tations of memories. Funes may believe that he has a clear recall of the dog seen 
frontally at 3.15, but without the processes of abstraction he doesn‟t have even a 
theoretical possibility of checking that he is right – and so the „perfect‟ memory is 
much  more  flawed, from the point of view of truth and veridical representation, 
than that of the boundedly rational person who forgets and misrepresents. 6  
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Cognition  and  the Environment 
It is also worth pointing out in this context that increasingly many psychological 
theories have followed Wittgenstein‟s lead and insisted that the content of psycho-
logical states cannot be determined solely by reference to states of the individual, 
that mental states (and thoughts, memories etc) are irredeemably world-involving. 
In particular, the idea of extended cognition, that our cognition depends crucially 
on our being embodied creatures and exploits aspects of our embodiment in real-
world environments, is of relevance here. A range of relevant respects of the envi-
ronment have been highlighted by theorists, all of which have a claim to essential 
involvement in the description of cognitive states. In the field of artificial intelli-
gence, Rodney Brooks has emphasized the physical aspects of the world in his bi-
ologically-inspired robotics (Brooks 1991), while in this tradition Andy Clark has 
placed  particular  emphasis  on  the  constructed  environment (Clark 1997). Going 
further, Harry Halpin, together with Clark and others, has argued for the special 
importance of the virtual environment (particularly the World Wide Web)  given 
our current technological capabilities (Halpin et al 2010). The grandfather of this 
philosophical tradition is of course Edmund Burke, whose 18
th century conserva-
tism posited the sociocultural environment, particularly traditions and institutions, 
as being essential to understanding our psychology (Burke 1968, O‟Hara 2011). 
Although the argument of this paper does not depend on the ideas of extended 
cognition, it gains a great deal of resonance in that context. If cognition was ex-
tended in the sense championed by Clark and others, then one would expect epi-
sodic  memory  to  make  ineradicable  reference  to  publicly-available  event traces 
and records, as well as what we might characterize as private, internal states. If, on 
the other other hand, one‟s governing philosophy was something like Fodorian 
methodological  solipsism  (Fodor  1980),  then  the  questions  generated  by  our 
sometimes  fraught  relationship  with  event  traces  and  records  would  be all the 
more puzzling. 
Theme #2: The Normativity of Truth 
Outsourcing Memory 
We (and other animals) have memories because they help the organism survive. 
Our bodies have mechanisms that allow the world outside to change some of their 
states, allowing recall of significant episodes. There is no need for those episodes 
to be represented exactly or accurately; it may be that the value of a fear reflex it 
greater  if  it  is  triggered  more  often  than  need  be  (in  other  words,  that  the 
„memory‟ of an organism is more effective if it tends to generate falsely positive 
identifications of threats). Proust also pointed out (as had Freud) that forgetting 7 
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had its own adaptive value when the past event was traumatic (for Proust, cf. e.g. 
Maurois 1962, 221-223, Flieger 1980). Memory is a servant to the self, and on the 
smooth functioning of the self does its utility depend, as the Irish novelist Sebas-
tian Barry suggests: 
It wasn‟t so much the question of whether she had written the truth about herself, or told 
the truth, or believed what she wrote and said were true, or even whether they were true 
things in themselves. The important thing seemed to me that the person who wrote and 
spoke was  admirable, living, and complete. (Barry 2008, 309) 
The use of external objects and constructed aspects of the environment to sup-
port memory is relatively recent and has tended to colour our perceptions of what 
is important about memory. Studies of oral cultures, which lack recourse to per-
manent representations, show that memory and the reconstruction of the past can 
have  very  different  properties  than  we  are  used  to  in  our  technological world 
(Goody 1998,  Ong 1982,  esp.57-67,  95-99,  136-152). 
In such cultures, verbatim recall of lists or words is rare – unsurprisingly, as it 
has very little obvious function in such a society. Early anthropologists occasion-
ally dismissed the memories of „primitives‟ as flawed because they had difficulty 
in regurgitating lists of words – yet of what use is that ability when one has no ex-
aminations to pass? Recollection becomes a performance, a creative act. History, 
for instance, becomes indistinguishable from politics, so that when an elder recites 
the ancestors of a chief through an implausibly large number of generations, what 
he is really doing is placing the chief in a political context which makes sense. The 
„ancestors‟ that are mentioned allow connections to be made between important 
dynasties, and so the elder is not performing an impressive feat of memory, but ra-
ther reflecting current power structures. As those structures change, then so will 
the family  tree. 
Memory of past events, or of a complex ceremony, is distributed across the par-
ticipants of the discourse; someone will chip in with his own ideas about a narrow-
ly circumscribed area. The aim of any mnemonics is to stimulate, not to aid recall. 
All  communication  is face-to-face, and so there is no need to leave records for 
others to use in the future, or to „speak‟ to people remotely. 
In an oral culture, the whole notion of „misrepresentation‟ is up for grabs. What 
is the truth here, when there is no permanent certified „truth‟ or record available 
for  comparison?  The  „fact‟  that  the  chief‟s  great-great-great-great-great-
grandmother is such-and-such will be a matter of the completest indifference to 
him, and so there will be no attempt to keep any kind of record of it; hence when 
the elder announces a family  connection that everyone accepts, what counts is that 
it is acceptable. The permanent truth that literate cultures get used to is replaced 
by a social truth founded in acceptability. 
The  development  of  literacy  gradually  provided  that certified  record against 
which individual memories could be compared for accuracy. Written words sup-
ported recall, but they also furnished an independent standard. Memory remained 
creative for a long time; for example, when Montaigne wrote phrases all over the 
beams in his tower, this was not to remind him of their content (he had a prodi-8  
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gious memory for classical literature). Rather, they were there to provoke new and 
interesting thoughts of his own. 
Adjustment to the literate world took time. In Plato‟s Phaedrus, Socrates took 
issue with those who relied on the written word; writing, he argued, introduces 
“forgetfulness into the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice using their 
memory because they will put their trust in writing, which is external and depends 
on signs that belong to others, instead of trying to remember from the inside, com-
pletely on their own. You have not discovered a potion for remembering, but for 
reminding; you provide your students with the appearance of wisdom, not with its 
reality (Plato 1997,  551-552). 
Socrates‟ own position dramatically illustrates the changes that literacy brought 
in; he wrote nothing himself (quite possibly because of the arguments set out in 
the Phaedrus) and exists for us only because of the many written representations 
of him and his practice by Plato, Xenophon, Aristophanes and Aristotle. It is a 
simple mistake to confuse Socrates‟ own philosophy with that of Plato, who ex-
pounds his own ideas through Socrates‟ mouth. Socrates‟ position not only points 
up the disadvantages (from the point of view of longevity of ideas and facts) of 
oral  culture,  but  also  makes it clear that having an objective record is hardly a 
panacea. For the austere military man Xenophon, Socrates emphasizes duty and 
self-reliance,  while  for  the  satirical  Aristophanes,  he  provokes  rebellion  while 
spouting  nonsense.  Plato‟s Socrates differs radically from dialogue to dialogue, 
sometimes a freedom-loving sceptic, sometimes a proto-fascist. 
The Public Record  and  the Intrusion  of Truth 
With the assistance of technology, writing and later photography evolved from be-
ing simply supports of memory. The inheritances of Gutenberg and Daguerre were 
the  fixed  objective records that were widely understood and shared through all 
levels of society. In such an environment, a new aspect of memory became possi-
ble. Memory could be held to account against the public record, and could be held 
as „wrong‟ if it contradicted it. Truth became normative for memory. 
Memory unmediated by technology has various functions to enable our coher-
ent interaction with the world. Such a memory presumably involves some veridi-
cal representations of past events, but need not always, or even usually, conform 
to the standard of comparison with a rich, permanent and objective record. When 
technology comes to mediate memory, then the permanence of the traces it leaves 
behind,  via  the  artefacts  that  individual  technologies  produce,  it  is  a  natural 
(though, historically, not an immediate) progression to regard those artefacts as 
objective truths. Once the content of representations is understood as being caused 
by external events, then the role of the representation as an objective standard for 
memories  of those events becomes available. 
This, of course, is a caricature of a number of complex psychological, social, 
technological and philosophical developments; it is not meant to be a potted histo-9 
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ry of memory. The point in this section is to argue that the spread of use of tech-
nologies as memory supports has created a situation in which truth is normative 
for memory in ways that it was not, and could not be, before those technologies 
existed,  and  that  to  treat  truth  as  normative  is  to  downplay  other  aspects  of 
memory that could have been and no doubt were important in the evolution of the 
faculty in both non-human animals and human societies. 
Theme #3: The Effects of Moore’s Law 
Printing and photography revolutionized the technological support of memory, as 
many have argued. Digital technologies have speeded up the process still further. 
In particular, the consequences of Moore‟s Law, that computing power per unit of 
silicon will double every 18 months (a „law‟ that has remained true for some 40 
years, resulting in an increase since the mid-1960s by a factor of an astonishing 
2
30. This massive increase in power has had three vital effects on society‟s relation 
to information. First, information is much easier to collect, for example by minia-
turization and mass production of devices and sensors. Second, it is easier to store, 
because memory capacity has increased. Third, it is easier to retrieve, as the in-
crease in computing power has enabled more effective algorithms for search and 
data mining. 
The Technology of Memory 
If  we  put these three themes together, we find ourselves in a world where it is 
deemed  increasingly  respectable  to  outsource  cognitive  function  (not  only 
memory)  to  increasingly  powerful  and  decreasingly  expensive  machines, which 
then have the broad effect of socializing our individual cognitive functions and, in 
the  extreme  case,  bringing  objectivity  into  personal psychology, the traditional 
realm of the subjective. Human memory has always been a rich source of inspira-
tion  and  metaphor  for  computer  memory  (O‟Hara  et  al  2006a),  but  our  under-
standing  of  human,  machine and social memory is converging in ways that are 
more  than  metaphorical  (O‟Hara  et  al  2006b).  Memory-supporting  technology, 
which at least initially was conceived as a medical resort, is becoming prominent 
(Garde-Hansen  et  al  2009).  The  development  of  prosthetics  for  the  memory-
impaired (certainly an important area of research), has branched out into the areas 
of leisure, social networking and self-improvement. 
The basic premise of memory-supporting technology is that one can outsource 
episodic  memory  to  digital  storage  devices.  The  three  effects  of Moore‟s Law 
have taken such technology out of the medical arena and into the social. The fact 
that one can more or less store anything one likes means that recording requires a 10  
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very  low  cognitive  overhead  –  one  needn‟t  worry about the extremely tedious 
tasks of choosing what information to store, or deciding what to delete when the 
memory gets full (consider, for example, how boring it is to keep an email inbox 
well-organised,  and  then imagine that task multiplied across every machine and 
modality in which one might wish to preserve information). Meanwhile, improved 
search and retrieval techniques mean that one can find what one needs relatively 
straightforwardly.  One  can,  in  short, use memory technology indiscriminately – 
which makes it usable (O‟Hara et al 2009). 
Furthermore, the indiscriminate use of such technology chimes in with the as-
sociative ways that human memory works. We store all sorts of pieces of „useless‟ 
information, precisely because we do not know at storage time what will be useful 
in  the  future.  The  guesses  we  make  about  what  memories  are  likely  to be im-
portant in the future are unlikely to be right all the time, so the more raw material 
that is present in our records of the past, the more likely we are to have everything 
that is useful (Bell and Gemmell 2009). That does not mean that one should spend 
the whole of one‟s life reviewing the whole of one‟s life. Rather, one has the re-
sources  to  remember  associatively,  because  associative memory requires a rich 
picture of the past to work effectively. No doubt most of what is stored will actual-
ly be, as anticipated, completely useless; data tends to have a long-tailed structure, 
where some pieces of information are used all the time, while most of the rest is 
hardly ever consulted. The cheapness and ease of digital information storage make 
it possible to preserve records without the need to consult them. 
It has been calculated that it would be straightforward to store 70 years of high 
quality  video  taken  from  a  lifetime  (Dix  2002);  this  has  prompted  the  United 
Kingdom  Computing  Research  Committee1  to  propose  „Memories for Life‟ as a 
Grand Challenge for computing research (Shadbolt 2003, O‟Hara et al 2006b) – in 
other  words,  a  potentially epoch-making area for research where breakthroughs 
would  promote  not  only computer science, but also social well-being in a wide 
population  (http://www.ukcrc.org.uk/grand-challenge/current.cfm).  As  a  Grand 
Challenge, research groups have been coalescing in this area, looking for example 
at  the  use  of  machines  to  act  as  companions  for humans (Wilks 2010, O‟Hara 
2010a), or the difficulties for archivists in curating the digital records of notewor-
thy people.2 Elsewhere, special-purpose tools have been helping communities use 
websites as collective memory resources. 3 
Prosthetic memory has been a major area of research. For instance, one device, 
the SenseCam developed by Microsoft, 4 is a small digital camera designed to take 
photographs passively, without user intervention, while it is being worn  around 
                                                                 
1 An expert panel of the British Computer Society, the Council of Professors and Heads of Com-
puting, and the Institution of Engineering and Technology to promote computing research in the 
UK (http://www.ukcrc.org.uk/about/index.cfm). 
2 http://www.bl.uk/digital-lives/. 
3 See e.g. http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/memoryshare/  or http://www.livememories.org/Home.aspx.  
4 http://research.microsoft.com/en -us/um/cambridge/projects/sensecam/.  11 
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the neck. It has no viewfinder or display to frame photos, but instead is fitted with 
a wide-angle lens that maximizes its field-of-view, ensuring that nearly everything 
in the wearer‟s view is captured. It also contains a number of different electronic 
sensors, including light-intensity and light-colour sensors, a passive infrared (body 
heat) detector, a temperature sensor, and a multiple-axis accelerometer, which are 
monitored by the camera‟s microprocessor, and certain changes in sensor readings 
can be used to automatically trigger a photograph to be taken. Hence a significant 
change in light level or the detection of body heat in front of the camera can cause 
the camera to take a picture. Alternatively, the user may elect to set SenseCam to 
operate on a timer, for example taking a picture every 30 seconds (Hodges et al 
2006). To review the SenseCam output, it is remarkably effective to run the result-
ing set of pictures as a speeded-up movie (De Bruijn  and Spence 2002). 
SenseCams have been shown to have remarkable positive effects on the memo-
ries of at least some sufferers of severe memory impairment; those who use and 
review  SenseCam images of significant events can often recall them better than 
those who have taken records more actively, for instance by keeping diaries (Ber-
ry et al 2007). However, these and similar devices are also used more and more 
frequently to record the behaviour of those with non-impaired memories, either to 
achieve an objective picture of real-life behaviour (of great value, for example, in 
market research – cf. Byrne et al 2008), or simply to record the quotidian details 
of daily life. Research by Alan Smeaton, Cathal Gurrin and others at Dublin City 
University  has  provided  the  tools  to allow daily use of SenseCam in this way. 
Gurrin in particular has worn a SenseCam around his neck almost daily for a peri-
od of years, and has amassed a personal record of several million images (Lee et al 
2008,  Doherty et al 2009). 
The  SenseCam  has  evolved  from a research tool to a consumer device. The 
practice  of  using  such  devices  to  record  daily  life  in  an  indiscriminate  way is 
called lifelogging. The lifelogger simply uses devices that amass information, and 
then stores the results. The SenseCam is a recording device, but of course one 
does  not  need  to  use  special-purpose  devices  like  that;  mobile  phones,  Web 
browsers, email programs, social networking sites and medical sensors all gener-
ate  information  that  is  of  potential  interest  to  the  lifelogger  (especially  among 
younger  people  with  their  greater  tendency  to  integrate  digital  and  connected 
technology into their daily lives – O‟Hara et al 2009). 
There are many important pioneers in this space, including Steve Mann who 
has  for many years worn devices to record his daily life,5 and Jennifer Ringley, 
who achieved notoriety  in 1996 for broadcasting the output of a camera in her 
bedroom across the Web (the so -called JenniCam – Jimroglou 1999). Perhaps the 
most committed is Microsoft executive Gordon Bell, who has developed a suite of 
technologies and practices to deal with the giant quantities of information one can 
generate in a normal life, and who has written about the potentially transformative 
                                                                 
5 http://www.eecg.toronto.edu/~mann/. 12  
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effects of such technologies for work, health and learning, as well as in everyday 
life (Bell  and Gemmell  2009). 
The present author is no enthusiast for such technologies, and has no intention 
of using them (and hence should not be regarded as a cheerleader for them). Nev-
ertheless, that does not mean that they will not become more ubiquitous; if they 
do, then they will have social effects with which we all will have to deal. A life-
logging world would be characterised by universality, both in terms of a high pro-
portion of people owning extensive records of their lives, and of those digital rec-
ords covering a high proportion of people‟s activities, so that more people would 
have access to more of their past lives. Such records are likely to be relatively du-
rable; even though there is always a danger of file formats becoming outdated and 
unsupported by present-day machines, the greater awareness of this problem in the 
computing industry means that more adaptable general-purpose standards for rep-
resentational  formats  are  likely to emerge. There is a strong likelihood that life-
logging records would be shared, not only because of the relative ease of copying 
and transfer compared to non-digital formats, but also because of a greater will-
ingness to use the World Wide Web as a sharing format, for instance on social 
networking  sites  (O‟Hara  et  al  2009).  The  power  of a great deal of information 
amalgamated from several of one‟s own devices, the lifelogging stores of others, 
information from social networks (e.g. Facebook or Flickr) and publicly-available 
information (e.g. using Google or Wikipedia) could be immense  in the provision 
of a rich picture of one‟s own life (and, as a by-product, of other people‟s too). 
If a large percentage of an influential stratum of society (say, college kids) be-
gan to use them, then it is possible that lifelogging will achieve critical mass, and 
the  effects  would  ramify  beyond  their  original  pockets of use. In such circum-
stances, Bell‟s prediction would seem far less hyperbolic. 
The coming world  of Total Recall will  be as dramatic a change … as the digital age …. It 
will change the way we work and learn. It will unleash our creativity and improve our 
health. It will change our intimate relationships with loved ones both living and dead. It 
will, I believe, change what it means to be human. (Bell and Gemmell 2009, 4). 
Certainly, if sufficient human ingenuity was devoted to trawling through digital 
records, it would be reasonable to go along with Bell‟s claim that „E-memories re-
veal  the  meaning of your life‟ (Bell and Gemmell 2009, 225), although the result 
may not be as positive as Bell anticipates. 
The Backlash 
As noted, the author of the present chapter is a neutral observer, but several com-
mentators have argued that the widespread use of memory-supporting technology 
(particularly  beyond  medical  applications)  will be a bad thing, either because it 
will have deleterious effects on society, or because it will be a frivolous misuse of 
resources. In this section I shall review a number of recent influential critiques; I 13 
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do not expect, in the space available, to refute or confirm any of them conclusive-
ly, but I do hope to contextualize these negative arguments with respect to the 
three themes outlined above, and to argue that the most worrying of them are con-
nected with the increasing normativity of truth for memory. 
Six Worries About Memory-Supporting Technology and 
Lifelogging 
The recent literature has thrown up six particular persistent worries, which I shall 
review in this subsection. This is not to say that these are new worries, but that 
they have either been presented in new guises, or alternatively have been felt more 
urgent as a result of recent technological developments. 
1.  Outsourcing leads to atrophy. In a recent work, Nicholas Carr has ar-
gued  that  digital  technologies  are  changing  the  ways  in  which  we 
think, read and remember, both as individuals and in our culture. „The 
offloading of memory to external data banks doesn‟t just threaten the 
depth and distinctiveness of the self. It threatens the depth and distinc-
tiveness of the culture we all share …. Outsource memory, and culture 
withers‟  (Carr  2010,  196-197).  This  train  of  thought  is  familiar  from 
Socrates‟ complaint in the Phaedrus (Plato 1997). 
2.  We won‟t remember the right things. Abigail Sellen and Steve Whit-
taker give a powerful critique of lifelogging, arguing that the total re-
call advocated by Gordon Bell will be less valuable than selective cap-
ture  of  information  that  can  provide  cues  for more effective use of 
human memory, and that „rather than trying to replace human memory 
with digital systems, system designers should look to capitalize on the 
strengths of human memory and help overcome its weaknesses‟ (Sel-
len & Whittaker 2010,  77). 
3.  Uselessness. The first worry is that the information gathered will be 
useless. „Rather than unfocused efforts to „capture everything‟, system 
designers  should  channel  their  efforts more fruitfully by identifying 
the situations where human memory is poor or targeting the things us-
ers most want to remember. These situations are where the systems 
would  provide  their  greatest  utility‟  (Sellen  &  Whittaker  2010,  77). 
Why bother capturing a load of stuff that humans can already remem-
ber, or alternatively aren‟t interested in remembering. 
4.  Too  much  information.  „Capturing  vast  arrays  of  data  might  over-
whelm  end  users  maintaining  and  retrieving  valuable  information 
from large archives; it also ignores the burden huge amounts of data 
impose  on  system  designers  and  developers‟  (Sellen  &  Whittaker 
2010,  75).  Viktor Mayer-Schönberger (2009) has also argued that we 
should  be  more  prepared to delete information because there is too 14  
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much  of  it  available for comfort, while Carr maintains that tools like 
the Web are bad for our health, because „the influx of competing mes-
sages that we receive whenever we go online not only overloads our 
working memory; it makes it much harder for our frontal lobes to con-
centrate our attention on any one thing. The process of memory con-
solidation  can‟t even get started‟ (Carr 2010, 194). Information over-
load has been perceived as a problem for a long time. 
5.  Unbalanced images and self-images. Legal scholar Anita Allen argues 
that an „unredacted lifelog could turn into a bigger burden on balance‟ 
because  „electronic  memory  enables  destructive  reminding  and  re-
membrance‟  (Allen 2008, 56-57). We would be more prone to dredg-
ing  up  horrible  memories  from  the past. „The lifelogging concept is 
insensitive to the therapeutic value of forgetting the details of experi-
ence‟ (Allen 2010, 64). „The technology will enable excessive rumina-
tion  by  persons  experiencing  unipolar  or bipolar depression‟ (Allen 
2010, 64-65). Mayer-Schönberger agrees that the consequences of this 
technology are that stupid adolescent mistakes can take on dispropor-
tionate significance in later life (2009). 
6.  Privacy.  Mayer-Schönberger  argues  that  „comprehensive  digital 
memory  represents  an  even  more  pernicious  version  of  the  digital 
panopticon‟ so that „the future has a chilling effect on what we do in 
the present‟ (Mayer-Schönberger 2009, 11-12). Allen sets out in some 
detail the argument that saving information about oneself would leave 
one open to invasions of privacy. Not only could one find oneself un-
der  surveillance  (or, as it is sometimes termed, „sousveillance‟) from 
lifelogger  friends  and  acquaintances  (Dodge  &  Kitchin  2007,  434-
437), but also „a government that has traditionally enjoyed access to 
communications and correspondence will want access to lifelogs‟ (Al-
len 2008,  67). 
The purpose of this chapter is not to argue that these worries are unfounded. 
Quite the opposite; I am sympathetic to most if not all of them, although I do 
think that they are often overstated. My main aim is to show that we can under-
stand these claims best in the context of the three themes set out above, and that 
once we do this we can best prioritize and if required address the problems. 
Worries Concerning Theme #1 
The first two worries, that outsourcing memory leads to atrophy and that we won‟t 
remember the right things, are connected with the theme of extended cognition. 
When  stated  baldly,  the two worries share a similar form: that the human mind 
does some things very well, and that replacing those functions with technology 15 
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will undermine the mind. This form presupposes strict dualisms between mind and 
world, and between authentic cognition and technology. 
However, as the work of Clark, Halpin, Brooks and others has suggested, these 
dualisms may be misleading. The philosophical idea of extended cognition implies 
that technologies are not transplanted, complete and fully-formed, into psychoso-
cial situations, but rather that we should expect the co-constitution of technologi-
cal  devices,  social  institutions  and  relations,  and  individuals‟  psychology. We 
make, and are in turn made by, the artefacts that we construct. We can certainly 
expect to be significantly altered psychologically and socially by new technolo-
gies, but that does not necessarily mean the alteration would be for the worse (in-
deed, since the embedding of new technology will result in our psychosocial re-
sources being adapted for a world containing that technology, it is not entirely 
clear what „for the worse‟ would even mean here). 
These worries also assume a level of technological determinism that is unwar-
ranted. It is quite likely that memory-supporting technologies will be appropriated 
opportunistically and unpredictably by different sectors of society, and that those 
technologies not perceived to have psychosocial value for users will wither on the 
vine in a kind of device Darwinism. If the information such technologies gather is 
widely perceived to be useless, then they will not be used. If, on the other hand, it 
is not perceived that way, then why should we not take that perception of interest-
ed users as veridical? And why should we not let device Darwinism, rather than 
philosophical or psychological argument, clear the field of unhelpful research? 
In short, memory-supporting technology will adapt to us, and we will adapt to 
it. If the adaptation is no fun, or not useful, then the technology will not be used. 
We will remain the boundedly rational beings we have always been, although per-
haps less bounded and maybe even more rational. If the worries of Carr, Sellen 
and  Whittaker  are  well-founded,  then  the  technologies  are  much  less  likely to 
thrive. 
Worries Concerning Theme #3 
The third and fourth worries, about the collection of useless information and in-
formation overload, can perhaps best be appreciated in the context of theme #3, 
Moore‟s Law. As noted, the increase in computing power over the last decades 
has been colossal, and has led to all sorts of unpredictable consequences, of which 
the feasibility of memory-supporting technology is just one. In general, statistics 
and number-crunching have time and again proved more useful than cleverer ways 
of processing information, because theorists constantly underestimate what com-
puters will be able to do by way of brute force. It may be that today’s computers 
cannot cope with a deluge of information, but in, say, 6 years‟ time, Moore‟s Law 
tells us that they will be 16 times more powerful. 16  
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In other words, Moore‟s Law can look after itself. It may be that the problems 
of redundancy, uselessness and overload will be made to seem paltry by develop-
ments in hardware in the short to medium term. Of course, it may be that they are 
not; Moore‟s Law is hardly a law of nature. The point is merely that the costs of 
uselessness or overload may be overestimated. 
Worries Concerning the Normativity of Truth 
The above considerations are not intended to imply that the first four worries are 
not real, but rather to point out that developments in social norms, mores, laws and 
technology could change their context completely. The same is not true of the last 
two worries, about self-images and privacy, which are connected with the second 
of the three themes, that of the increasingly prominent role of truth as normative 
for memory. The danger, broadly, is that we will be confronted with the truth and 
nothing but the truth – but not necessarily (in fact, probably not) the whole truth. 
That context is not, unlike those of extended cognition and Moore‟s Law, subject 
to change, and therefore, all things being equal, these two worries seem to be the 
most trenchant of the six outlined above. 
The development of memory-supporting technology will result in a great deal 
of reliable information swilling around, relatively easy to access, from all sorts of 
sources  including surveillance, sousveillance, social networking and lifelogging. 
Our  social  norms  seem  to be developing too slowly to keep pace; we live in a 
world of what we might call „Intimacy 2.0‟, where rights to privacy are constantly 
neglected, eschewed, ignored or undervalued by a society that is increasingly ex-
hibitionist and archival (O‟Hara 2010b). One danger of a situation where there is 
social upheaval while social norms fail to keep pace is that there will be pressure 
to conform; lifelogging is currently a fringe activity, and if all lifeloggers are vol-
untary then it may be unproblematic even if they become a majority. Allen antici-
pates the possibility that we might reach a situation where someone who wishes to 
retain control of the information about them (the traditional conception of infor-
mational privacy) comes to be seen to be abnormal; in that case, the fact that one 
does not keep a lifelog may itself be seen as suspicious (Allen 2008, 74). In such a 
world,  our  reasonable expectations of privacy (an important aspect of common-
law  protection  of  privacy)  will  decline  (McArthur  2001,  Bailey  and  Kerr  2007), 
with potentially deleterious effects across society. 
There is an additional danger of seeing this sort of problem as exclusively a 
technological one. Not only could memory, which as Sellen and Whittaker argue 
(2010, 77) is a complex, multi-faceted set of concepts, come to be seen in an im-
poverished way as Proust‟s „simple cinematographic vision‟, but also that what 
may be sociotechnical problems come to be seen as amenable to technological so-
lutions. 17 
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Entirely  technical  solutions  are very unlikely to work. As has been noted in 
many quarters, the use of complex privacy controls merely confuses users; priva-
cy-enhancing technologies generally suffer severe usability problems (Sasse and 
Flechais 2005). The point of lifelogging is that one does not have to think too hard 
about collecting, storing and retrieving information (O‟Hara et al 2009); one of the 
ways  that  social  networking  sites  like  Facebook can get people to share infor-
mation in more lucrative ways (for advertisers) is to set privacy defaults at a low 
level. Security techniques are similarly flawed; of course good security is a fine 
thing, but in a socio-technical system it is not just the technology but the way it is 
used that needs to be made secure. There is no point getting someone to create and 
regularly change a complex password if they end up having to resort to sticking it 
onto their computer screen with a Post-It (Ingelsant and Sasse 2010). 
Mayer-Schönberger suggests the use of sell-by dates for information, so that 
stored  information  has  associated  with  it  a  deletion  date  (Mayer-Schönberger 
2009,  171-181).  One  creates  one‟s  Word file, say, and as part of the settings it 
might include a date when the file deletes itself (say, one year after the last edit). 
One could reset this at any time (as one can reset other metadata parameters, such 
as read and write permissions or filenames). 
This idea has severe usability difficulties associated with it. The idea that one‟s 
old essays, letters or whatever might disappear because one forgot to set the de-
lete-by date properly, is disturbing. It is hard to see it catching on; it seems a reci-
pe for irritation (another box to think about before I can start editing my file), mis-
understanding  (particularly  in  a corporate context when files may have multiple 
editors with different ideas about this sort of thing), confusion (how does one cal-
culate the time when information will become useless?), neglect (as one more and 
more often resorts to the default) and finally horror (oh my God my teenage nov-
el/pictures of Grandpa/bookmarks  relating to my old research have disappeared). 
In general, philosophies of deletion seem to throw the baby out with the bath-
water;  the  advantages  of  abundant  information  seem  clear  and  overwhelming, 
even if there will be associated difficulties. Information is clearly valuable, and is 
obviously perceived to be so because so many people spend so much time and ef-
fort trying to gather it. Storage and retrieval are incredibly cheap, certainly by his-
torical standards, in which case the germane question is not „why are we doing 
this?‟ but rather „why not?‟ 
Dodge and Kitchin (2007) suggest that we might subvert the aims of those who 
wish  to  breach  our  privacy  by  a  process  of  randomized  falsification.  Lifelogs 
might be programmed to change a small number of pieces of information so that 
they misrepresent reality. This is an interesting suggestion, as it uses the norma-
tivity of truth to undermine threats to privacy or self-perception; because truth is 
normative, and because it is possible that information retrieved from the lifelog is 
false,  then  the  information,  or  what  Bell  calls  the  e-memory  (Bell  and Gemmell 
2009),  is that much less valuable. 
This solution, though clever, is I think too clever by half. The problem is that 
although the normativity of truth is a problem, the value of the lifelog is its truth. 18  
Narcissus to a Man 
Randomized  falsification  undoes  some  of the worries about memory-supporting 
technologies  at the cost of rendering them less useful. In general, making them 
less useful will address all the worries given above, because if they are less useful 
they are less likely to be used, and therefore the anticipated problems with them 
are less likely to occur. The lifelog‟s creator wants access to information that is 
true; he is not interested in having false memories (the pro-lifelogging literature 
harps on at great length about the fallibility of memory – e.g. Bell and Gemmell 
2009, 51-56). So a system that serves up potentially false information seems not to 
fit the bill at all. 
Conclusion:  The Perils of Rich Representations 
In the Phaedrus, Socrates warns not only on the atrophying effects of writing on 
the memory,  but also of its effects on discourse. 
You know, Phaedrus, writing shares a strange feature with painting. The offsprings of 
painting stand there as if they are alive, but if anyone asks them anything, they remain 
most solemnly silent. The same is true of written words.  You‟d think they were speaking 
as if they had some understanding, but if you question anything that has been said because 
you want to learn more, it continues to signify just that very same thing forever. When it 
has once been written down, every discourse  roams about everywhere, reaching 
indiscriminately those with understanding no less than those who have no business  with 
it, and it doesn‟t know to whom it should speak and to whom it should  not. And when it is 
faulted and attacked unfairly, it always needs its father‟s support; alone, it can neither 
defend itself nor come to its own support. (Plato 1997, 552) 
The written is pathetically unequal to the spoken; spoken discourse can include 
interrogation,  clarification,  self-defence  and  discrimination,  because  rather  than 
simply  being  presented automatically, it has to be presented by an experienced 
speaker who has an interest in ensuring that his or her words are maximally effec-
tive. 
Given the usefulness of writing, it seems that Socrates‟ plaints were overdone; 
few would advocate a return to an oral culture, even as an Edenic fantasy. Howev-
er, his point is well-made in so far as the shift from orality to literacy required cor-
responding shifts in norms to regulate our expectations with respect to discourse in 
general. It may be, if lifelogging and the use of memory-supporting technologies 
take off as its advocates, like Bell, predict, that an analogous shift will also be re-
quired.  We  have  been  used to our pasts decaying from scrutiny at predictable 
rates; no doubt our e-memories will degrade, but not in a smooth way. One might 
lose last week‟s photographs while the ones of that embarrassing party thirty years 
ago remain stubbornly current (one is reminded, for instance, of the notorious pho-
tograph of the Oxford Bullingdon club in 1987 containing the future Prime Minis-
ter of the United Kingdom David Cameron and Mayor of London Boris Johnson, 
which  somewhat  undermines  the images that they try to foster in their voters). 
This is a new circumstance, where one‟s past cannot be expected simply to erase 19 
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itself, and it is one to which we need to adapt. Like the texts that Socrates decried, 
a past lifelog will have a presence, and we will need to understand what it is say-
ing – and what it is not. This is preferable to Mayer-Schönberger‟s Canutian idea 
of building deletion into the technology, or to Dodge and Kitchin‟s randomized 
falsification. 
In the greatest work of art yet created about lifelogging, Samuel Beckett‟s play 
Krapp’s Last Tape (Beckett 1959), Krapp has two obsessions: recording every de-
tail of his life, and listening to his old recordings. In the play we see his elderly 
self listening to a recording of his middle-aged self who has just listened to a re-
cording of his youthful self. The dislocation shouts at us, as Beckett undermines 
our notions of the unity and continuity of the self. „Just been listening to that stu-
pid bastard I took myself for thirty years ago, hard to believe I was ever as bad as 
that.‟ 
The point is not about good and bad technologies, but rather their use and mis-
use. We need to guard not against information processing and storage power, but 
rather  what  comes  with  them,  particularly  in  the  context  of  the  normativity  of 
truth. 
First of all, we need to guard against the closed world assumption. In compu-
ting and knowledge representation, this is the assumption that whatever cannot be 
asserted on the basis of a knowledge base is false – in other words, the assumption 
that the knowledge base is complete. With respect to a lifelog, or even all lifelogs 
put together, or even the whole of the World Wide Web, this is a very dangerous 
assumption.  To  assume  that  all  useful,  interesting  or  germane  information  has 
been digitally recorded, or to assume that „if I can‟t find it with Google it can‟t be 
important‟ is extremely worrying in a world which is partially recorded by digital 
technologies, but where major inequalities of access correlated with age, educa-
tional achievement or nationality are evident. The recording angel in the Book o 
Ezekiel may be exhaustive but the World Wide Web could not function with such 
a centralized structure – and we should not behave as if it does. 
Second, we must guard against the assumption of, or demand for, consistency. 
If  truth  is  normative  for  memory,  then  inconsistency  is symptomatic of a false 
memory somewhere. Yet given the shades of meaning and understanding underly-
ing  memories,  it is not only plausible but commonplace to find different people 
with entirely different memories of an event, created and curated in good faith. A 
future world where one‟s testimony was automatically assessed as of less worth 
than, say, the records of one‟s Web browsing clickstream, or one‟s email inbox, or 
one‟s  camera,  would  be  a  very  worrying  one.  Even  if  truth  is  normative  for 
memory, the e-memories of browser, email program and camera are subject to in-
terpretation too. 
Third, we must guard against hindsight. Decisions made under uncertainty may 
seem to be poor, yet it is extremely easy to underestimate the complexity of such 
decision-making when we are in possession not only of the record of how the con-
sequences of a decision unfolded, but also a richer picture of the context of that 
decision than could possibly have been available at the time. 20  
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Fourth, as many commentators have noted, there is an increasingly lack of in-
terest in, and respect for, the distinction between public and private space. In part, 
this is the result of a lack of care in society as a whole, as I have argued elsewhere. 
One blatant misrepresentation that is often passed around is that privacy is in the 
interest of the individual, while publicity is in the interest of wider society („the 
community‟). Nothing could be further from the truth; abundant information and 
transparency are often in the interests of the individual, while privacy is in many 
respects a public good (O‟Hara 2010b). Its neglect can often be seen as a tragedy 
of the commons (Anderson and Moore 2006). 
Broadly  speaking,  our  autonomy  demands  informational  self-determination. 
That is not an easy thing to define or protect, and cannot simply be assimilated to 
our preferences for sacrificing privacy for material gain. In particular, even though 
the  growth  of  lifelogging  and  memory-supporting  technologies  continues,  we 
should be careful that this does not undermine our reasonable expectations of pri-
vacy. We should not be seduced by the richness of the lifelog into accepting all its 
assumptions, assertions and details. 
We should, at all costs, retain the right to be a mystery. 
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